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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1607 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-19; J2-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
..a
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% REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1509
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1608
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA 1
54V76AII4R J2-19; J2-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1609 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-38; J2-26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1511
WDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W ..... _
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
INDEPENDENT OR_ ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1610 ABORT: 3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTRO LS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A .......
5) RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA 1
54V76AII4R J2-38; J2"26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS?0-94_099 _EV B EO BI2; JSC_:ii_74, SPACE SHUTTLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1611 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-91; J2-98
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1513
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1612
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R 72-91; J2-98
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1514
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1613 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-10; J2-93
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1515
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS __ET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1614 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-10; J2-93
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1615 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-9; J2-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3120187 C-1517
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1616 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHA_ HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BF ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ] _-
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-9; J2-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORK_HEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1617 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-92; J2-16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1519
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87
ARCS
1618
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HA_UFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-92; J2-16 .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO THE GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK .....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSM_ENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1619 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2"20; J2-86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1521
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1620
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
-_FLIGHT: 3/
ABORT: 3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL;
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAy 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-20_ J2-86' ...... _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT_ TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO THE GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
w
mm
z
mm
= =
mm
m
m
M
im
gm
D
Z
i
m
m
J
B
i
l
gm
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1522
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS woRK_HEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1621 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-59; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION..
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1523
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1622
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONO-RBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-59; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK ...............
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1524
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1623 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AlI5R J2-89; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87
ARCS
1624
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
-FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: _D.J. PAUL==
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
I
FLIGHT Pm_SE _DW/n;NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATI ON:
P_T NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76AIISR J2-89; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAI_BLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK :_
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1526
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1625 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISR J2-76; Ji-62
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1527
lDATE: I/2 I/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1626
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT i
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/:) '
313
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2 _
PART NUMBER: 55V76All5R J2-76; JI-62 ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
....... _ ..... i_ i_i_i_i _
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REFE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _ I
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1528
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1627 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
T)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AllSR J2-91; J2-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1529
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/2 I/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1628
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAP! D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONT_OLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c c ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76AIISR J2-91; J2-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK .... -
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1530
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1629 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISR J2-95; J2-19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
l
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1531
iINDEPENDENT ORBITERLASSE_SM_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1630 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
r
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D,J, PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-95; J2-i9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1532
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS wORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1631 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AlI5R J2-92; J2-18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1533
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMANALYSISW0RKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1632 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-92; J2-18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1534
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1633 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS_ A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV'BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISR J2-90; J2-26
] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1535
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1634 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-90_ J2-26_ _i_iii.. i.._
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TA_BACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO THE GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1536
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1635 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-81; J2-28
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1537
lINDEPENDEN_QRBITER ASSESSMENT.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1636 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: _SISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
_AD _ALYST_ W.A. _UFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) E_CTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CR!TICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/F_C
P_UNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
RED_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76AII5R J2-81; J2-28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAI_BLE TO THE GPC.
REFE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE S_TTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1538
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1637 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
?)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-86; Ji-49
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION..
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1539
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87
ARCS
1638
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W_:
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST_ W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD" D.J. PAUL ......
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
mm
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
m
mm
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76Ali5R J2-86; J1-49
m
[]
z
E
I
mm
ms
m
HDW/FUNC ----
3/3 i
3/3
3/3 _"
3/3 []
!c[ ] m
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1639 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J3-I18; AIR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1541
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1640
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W_
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST" W.A. HAUFLER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
......CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3 :_
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AlI6 J3-118; AIR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1641 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J3-i18;; AIR8
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1543
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1642 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-i18;; AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1643 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-75; A3R6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES
UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC
POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN VALVE
COMMAND S END. PROLONGED POWER T0 VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
ALSO LOSE THE TWO "OX ISOL VALVE" POSITION TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1545
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/2o/87DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1644
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES _
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS :
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76A116 J2-75 ;A3R6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70'943099 _9 B _O Bf2; JSe iilV4;_ SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_D_K _ _ .... _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1645 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-55; A3R4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN OR CLOSE VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI27 JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1547
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1646 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W _c
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-55; A3R4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1647 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-56;; A2RI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1549
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1648 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J2-56;; A2R13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1649 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ .].
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J2-65; A3R5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
t
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1551
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1650 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, i.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-65; A3R5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TA_BACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK '_i_ ...........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1651 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J2-31; J5-41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
t REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1652 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-31; J5-41
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECTS. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1554
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1653 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESS_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1654
HIGHEST CRITICALITy
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV I/2 .......
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY .SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD •
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TAIlbACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
.... , , =
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1556
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1655 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1557
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1656 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE"IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1558
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1657 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. KAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J6-1; AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1559
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1658 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD" D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS _ i_
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AoA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
31_
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AiI4 J6-1; _AIR20 ......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REF_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1560
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1659 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76All4R J6-1;; J3-89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1561
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1660 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AlI4R J6-1;; J3-89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1562
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1661 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
"6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J3-85; A3R8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN VALVE
COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
ALSO LOSE THE TWO "OX ISOL VALVE" POSITION TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
m REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1563
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1662 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76All4 J3-85; A3R8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1564
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1663 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1,2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J3-56; A3R9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN OR CLOSE VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1565
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1664 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-56; A3R9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK l
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1566
W
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1665 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76All4R J6-60; J2-79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1567
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1666 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA 1
54V76AII4R J6-60; J2-79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK =
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1568
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1667 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AlI4 J3-77; A3RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1569
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1668 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-77; A3RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1570
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87
ARCS
1669
HIGHESTCRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-59;; J2-78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1571
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1670 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
F
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] .......
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-59;; J2-78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECTS. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1572
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1671 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AlI4 J6-2; AIR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1573
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBsYSTEM _ALYS iS _W_KSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1672 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
5) RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 _ ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J6-2; AIR19 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
.... z......
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1574
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1673 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-2; J3-88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1575
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSM_ENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_KEHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1674 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST" W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD" D.J. PAUL ....
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3 _
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-2; J3-88 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE _GE. _
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1576
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1675 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A115 J1-31; J1-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 1 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
M
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1577
INDEPENDENT ORBiTER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1676
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABO_T HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-31; JI-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1578
R
mm
B
m
U
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITE_nSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_K_HEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1677 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-32; Ji-88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1579
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/2i287
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1678
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W _:_z__ _
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL _ :
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
¢RITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 JI-32; Ji-88 ..........
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK .... _.... _ Im
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1580
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1679 ABORT:
HDW FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 Ji-21; Ji-75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1581
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_W_RKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1680 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D,J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CR!T_CALI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCy SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] :::
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-21; Ji-75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1681 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Jl-12; JI-73
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1583
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1682 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU !SOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART _MBER:
AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76Al15 Jl-12; Ji-73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOR_SHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1683 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Ji-68; Ji-65
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 1 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1684
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Ji-68; JI-65
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _ ,_ ......... _ _ .....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORMSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1685 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-22; Ji-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1587
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1686 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 AT0: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 J1-22; J1-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDB00K ...............
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1687 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Jl-13; Ji-72
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1688 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76All5 Jl-13; J1-72
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1689 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-24; J2-8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 2 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1591
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/2 I/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1690
HIGHEST=CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A' HAUFLER SUBSYS _AD: D'J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
1373
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, M CA 2
54V76AII4 J2-24/ J2-8 .... _ .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _ ..... _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1691 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A. [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-45; J2-35
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1593
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1692 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, M CA 2
S4V76AIi4 J2-45; J2-35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1693 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76A114 J2-3; J2-60
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1595
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1694 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W _
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS ___
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-3; J2-60
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1695 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J2-2; J2-95
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1696 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD" D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & F_ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-2; J2-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, 0VER_AD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1697 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-30; J2-53
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1599
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1698 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2 ...........
PART NUMBER: 54V76A114 J2-30; J2-53
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK .............. m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1699 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-6; J2-61
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1601
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1700 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUN¢
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-6; J2-61
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TAU<BACKIS STILLAVAIU BLETO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1602
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1701 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76A114 J2-4; J2-97
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i,
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1603
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1702 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 5/3
ATO: 3/3
B [ ] _C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76Al14 J2-4; J2-97 .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1703 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AlI6 J2-69; ASR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR 'WAFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 3 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
m REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1704 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU iSOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: _A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-69; A5R6 _ _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1606
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1705 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-68; ASR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3 ISOL SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
i
u
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1607
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1706 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-68; A5R2 _ .... _ _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC._
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1608
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1707 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-32; A2R27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1609
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1708 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, M CA 3
56V76AlI6 J2-32; A2R27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1610
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1709 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-34; A2R29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1611
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1710 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76Al16 J2-34; A2R29 _-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1711 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-91; A4RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 3 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1613
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER sUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOR_HEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1712
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.3. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-91; A4RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK - .......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1713 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
%)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-33; A2R30
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR 'fOX MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1615
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1714
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, M CA 3
56V76AII6 J2-33_ A2R30 _ _;_;
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1715 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-45; A2R28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1617
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1716 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FUISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 - AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3731
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [. ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-45; A2R28 .:._ ...... i _ i
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1717 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTRO LS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; ASR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 4 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
=
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1718 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; ASR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHO'CK, OVER_AD .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TA_BACK IS STILL AVAILABLETO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS _m_DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1719 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; AIR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1621
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1720
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
5) RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; AIR24
CAUSE S:C___0NT_AMINATION,_ vIBRATION' MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC. /
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1721 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-23; A2R44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; Jsc 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1623
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1722 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-23; A2R44 ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GP C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1723 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J3-45; A2R47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1625
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1724 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
e)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ - ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART _MB_.R: 56V76AII6 J3-45; A2R47 _ ...........
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1725 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-73; A3RI0
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE 'fOX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 4 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1627
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1726 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC _
3/3
3/3
3/3 -
9/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3 ....
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J3-73; A3Ri0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
[]
l
m
i
m
B
[]
[]
i
B
m
m
mm
i
i
=
i
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1628
[]
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1727 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-34; A2R46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1629
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1728 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, S.IK I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
E_CTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-34; A2R46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
D
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1630
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1729 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-46; A2R48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 4 iSOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
u
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1631
iDATE: 1122/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1730
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS _
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J3-46; A2R48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2;
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK "
JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
ARCS
1731
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-43; R125
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR
"MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1633
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1732 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FLrNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J2-43; R!25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE POSITION. LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OA1, SO PROVIDESI
_LL _(0 _8_ vD_f_:STE_D __F_:m_LF_ To 14_) WLTA_ _.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS tt_DB00K
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1634
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1733 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-43; J2-29
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE POSITION' LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OAI, SO PROVIDES
FULL (0 TO 28 VDC) INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1635
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1734
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J2-43; J2-29 _ _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE PO_T_QN, SWITCH OPE_TION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR
"ISOL VALVE" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1636
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1735 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-42; J2-27
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
OPEN POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE
ISOL VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS::WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1736 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-42; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1737 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-46; RII8
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1639
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
ARCS
1738
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
5) RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
6) "
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-46; RII8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1739 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-41; RI21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1641
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1740 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [. ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-41; RI21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1741 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J8-66; R120
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE FOUR TALKBACKS FOR OPEN AND CLOSED POSITIONS OF BOTH "OX
& FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES". ALSO LOSE INHIBITS TO STOP OPENING
OR CLOSING VALVES WHEN THEY ARE FULLY OPENED OR CLOSED,
RESPECTIVELY, BUT THIS WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVES. ALSO LOSE
INHIBITS TO STOP OPENING OR CLOSING VALVES WHEN THEy ARE FULLY
OPENED OR CLOSED, RESPECTIVELY, BUT THIS WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1643
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1742 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) _ ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
9)
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J8-66; RI20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1644
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1743 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
4)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-45; RII9
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE.
i
- 4
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1645
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1744
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS _ _
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS _
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W _ .......
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3 ....
56V76AI23R J2-45; RII9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
m
m
l
B
mm
Z
B
l
m
m
m
mm
[]
I
z
w
mm
B
mm
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK i
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1646
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1745 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-40; R122
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK "FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1647
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1746 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-40; R122
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
I
[]
ms
m
mm
m
mm
[]
mm
m
I
m
m
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK m
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1648
m
m
i
m
mu
u
l
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1747 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTRO LS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH
FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE
CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE,
THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM CONTACT SET i, 2,
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER
THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPEL_LA/_TS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TAN}( LANDING ........
WEIGHT CON-STRA_TS AND/_OR TH--ECG SA?ETY B()UNDARIES, AND MAY
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 03/22/87
6
C-1649
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
!748 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION._
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM i_ _ :_: _ _i!_
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: _CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL ....
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDA/_CY PROVIDED B_YTHE MDM COMMANDS, IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTRgL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN _.....
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY,
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, _DMAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING RT_LS ABORTS TO MEET THET_K--_"LANbING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 03/22/87
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kINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1749 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK _SOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73ATSI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1651
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1750 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI6; S19
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF
OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR
CLOSED BY THE SWITCHOR BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT
ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DC, CC
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1652
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1751 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $16; PNL 07 $19
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI6; S19
c [p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH
SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR
GPC POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS,
AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1653
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1752 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1654
I
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1753 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
r
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1655
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1754 ABORT:
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE _CON-T_T-S- FAiL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS _ _
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S-19 _
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S16; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH
SETS OF CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF EITHER THE INDIVIDUAL
VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL AFFECT pROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND
MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS
TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
I
mm
m
m
m
i
i
m
B
B
g
M
I
U
i
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1656
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
1755 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS AND THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS. IF EITHER SETS OF CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT
POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1657
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
1756 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
LIR OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 112 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OpEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7S16; $19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY,
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B!2, DC, CC
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1658
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1757 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7S16; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1659
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1758 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i0
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
5) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1660
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1759 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I0
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7S16; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1661
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1760 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
11, 12
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $16; PNL 07 $19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: v
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH
SETS OF CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF EITHER THE INDIVIDUAL
VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1662
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/22/'87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
1761 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
ii, 12
FAILURE MODE"
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS II, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $16; PNL 07 $19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN'THAT POSITIONAND CAN BE
OPENED OR CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. WORST CASE FAILURE
OF EITHER THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMANDS
WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY,
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1663
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITYDATE:
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1762 ABORT:
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B :
5) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73ATS20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM OPEN COMMANDS, AND BY THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE ONLY TO OPEN THE VALVE. VALVE CANNOT BE
CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. IF THE
VALVE IS VALVE IS OPEN WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURS, AND THE MDM CLOSE
COMMAND PATH FAILS, THIS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PR6__T DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES,
AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1664
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1763 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WiLL--RE-MAIN CLOSED/ CAN BE OPENED ONLY
BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE RECLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT LANDING
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1665
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1764 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN CLOSED POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C.[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SI7, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY
SWITCH OR GPC COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE
THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN,
AND CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE REOPENED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE vALvE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT LANDING
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1666
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1765 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
2
6)
7)
s)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: "A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS OR BY THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND
CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1667
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1766 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SW OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: "PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI7, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE FALVE
WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. IF THE
OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED
POSIT;ON J THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY
SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE RECLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM
THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF EITHEROF THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE MDM COMMANDS WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1668
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INDEPENDENT......... ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1767 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
L
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1669
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
-- I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1768 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
4
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 5/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73ATSIT, S18; 33V73ATS20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS OR BY THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND
CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO Bi2, DB, CB
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1670
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1769 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
5, 6
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SIT, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY
BY MDM COMMAND, AND CAN BR OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO
CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE
CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK WEIGHT LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1671
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1770 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
5, 6
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
0NORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $17, $18; PNL 07 $20, $2!
33V73ATS17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
GPC COMMAND. IF THECLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN, AND CAN BE
CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE REOPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER OF THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE MDM
COMMANDS WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK WEIGHT LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1672
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1771 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM CONTACT SETS I, 2, AND THEN
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER THE
INDIVIDUAL VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM COMMANDS WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1673
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1772 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS AND THEN
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS OR TAL ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES,
AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1674
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1773 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ....... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BVY MDM COMMANDS. TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USETHE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1675
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1774 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSS?EED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73ATS32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1676
m
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1775 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL O7 $32; PNL 07 $34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MEM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1677
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1776 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1777 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73ATS32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
_=
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1679
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1778 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1680
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
ARCS
1779
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1681
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1780 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1682
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1781 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73ATS32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MEM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1683
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYS_M:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
_CS FLIGHT: 3/3
1782 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
9, i0
FAIL_ MODE:
L/R OX & _ CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD _ALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTRO_
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & _ CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRIT!CALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS _E NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1684
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1783 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
9, l0
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, l0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1685
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1784 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS Ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 S34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S32; $34
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
g
mmm
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1686
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1785 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS II,
FAILURE MODE:
i2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENs: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCHIS CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1687
INDEPENDENT QRB_TER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 2/IR
1786 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION.
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $36
33V73A7S36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RCS/RCS CROSSFEED IS POSSIBLE ONLY FROM THE RIGHT OR ONLY FROM
THE LEFT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1688
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1787 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $36
33V73A7S36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE GPC CONTROLLED RCS/RCS
CROSSFEED. CROSSFEED CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MDM COMMANDS OR BY
MANUAL RCS SWITCH RECONFIGURATION.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND
MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS
TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1689
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1788 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN.
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAULLEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS _
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _i i
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
5) MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM
LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $36
33V73A7S36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CROSSFEED CAN BE CONTROLLED BY MDM COMMANDS, OR BY MANUAL RCS
SWITCH RECONFIGURATION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1690
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1789
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV _/2 & 3/4/5
5) MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM
LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $36
33V73A7S36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RCS/RCS CROSSFEED IS POSSIBLE ONLY FROM THE RIGHT OR ONLY FROM
THE LEFT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1691
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_SuBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1790 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSS FEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM CONTACT SET I, 2, AND THEN
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER THE
INDIVIDUAL VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM COMMANDS WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD g
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1692
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1791 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM TREE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS OR TAL ABORTS
TO MEEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 03/30/87 C-1693
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
i/22/--87 HI GHEST CRITI CALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1792 ABORT:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LaAD ANALYST: v.J. BUR_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35 ......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS, TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/ORO THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT
ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1694
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1793 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1695
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1794 ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS I, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE sWITcH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1696
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1795 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 5/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1697
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1796 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.+
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: K [ ] B [
LOCATION: PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S33; $35
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD I
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1698
iim
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1797 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CO,ACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1699
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1798 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKD0_ HIERARCHY:
!)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 3 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SET OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, ?ALLURE OF ALLREDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY _D MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CS SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1700
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS W6RKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1799 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORB IT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; S35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS' IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TAK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1701
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER _sUBSYSTEM _ALYSI_ _WO_EET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHESTCRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1800 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R ox _ _ CROSSFEEDVLV 3/4/5 SWITCH_PEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED _ILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMM_D. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, _D CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW_ST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/MITE PROCEDURES. FAILU_ OF ALL
_D_D_CY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPE_TIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1801 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, l0
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1703
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
r
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1802 ABORT:
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 9, i0
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 S35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD l
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1704
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1803 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I 0 N:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES : VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1705
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
1804 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
CONTACTS Ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/SSWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY"
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 ......
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRZTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: .3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SET OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CS SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
M
l
ms
m
B
m
ms
B
D
z
i
I
i
m
B
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1706
l
mm
um
m
b
l
m
b
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1805 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; S27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSEDBYSWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
z
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1707
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1806 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
2/IR
3/2R
3/2R
312R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
PA_T NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; $27
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC .............
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1807 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY sWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1709
RDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1808 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CO,ACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM ...........
MANIFOLD I, L/R o_'_:_'_OL VLvS ::
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P']
LOCATION: PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMMAND,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTH SDUMPS DURING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1809 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS l, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S22; PNL 07 $27
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; S27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1711
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1810 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1811 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22 ; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1713
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
......1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1812 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMm_DS. iF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1813 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOLVLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 .$27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUSTREMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PRO
CEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1715
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1814 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3 / 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OpEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. _ TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILUREOF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1815 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73ATS23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILLCLOSE AND CANNOTBEOPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1717
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1816 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS _ ....
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & F-u_SOL VLVS _
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBiT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART" NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1817 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMMAND,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DUMPS DURING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOS AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1719
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1818 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1819 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1721
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1820 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1821
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; S28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1723
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1822 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PRO
CEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TAK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1724
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1823 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH?_ILS=INTHE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1725
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1824 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER sUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1726
I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1825 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
cAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1727
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAIL_ MODE:
_ _ALYST:
INDEPENDENT O_ITER ASSESSMENT
ORBIT_ _STEM _ALYSIS WO_HEET
I/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_CS FLIG_:
1826 A_RT:
M_IFOLD 3, L/R OX & _ ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS _AD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ET._C_I_L COMPONENTS
CONTRO_
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
M_IFOLD 3, L/R OX & _ ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CO,ACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE _W/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
_CATION: PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
PUT _MBER: 33V73ATS24; $29
c[p]
CAUSES: CO_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, _E_AL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIO_ _
_D_D_CY PROVIDED BY THE MDM oPEN COMM_DS. _ IF THE oPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN _T POSITION, C_ BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMM_D,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, _E C_ _ST _MOVE CONTROL BUS POWER _OM THE CO,ACTS,
_D THEN USE GPC READ/_ITE_ PROCED_S. FAIL_ OF ALL
RED_D_CY WILL AFFECT PROPEL_T DUMP LENGTHS DUMPS D_ING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPEL_T D_ING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE T_K _DING WEIGHT
CONST_INTS _D/OR THE CG SAFETY BO_D_IES, _D MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs _D _Is.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 _V B EO B12, DF, CF
_PORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1728
n
|
l
[]
I
R
m
i
[]
==
m
i
I
M
z
i
=
g
I
g
lw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1827 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1729
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1828 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: -MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM .....
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
PART NUMBER: 33V73ATS24; $29
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE ."
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1730
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1829 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1731
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1830 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C j C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLy BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1732
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1831 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILLREMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1733
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1832 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC.
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: .A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE_ .......
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DF, CF
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1734
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1833 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1735
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1834 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 R_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
211R
312R
312R
312R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE_BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1736
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1835 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
COMMAND i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN COMMAND 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73ATS25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMMAND,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DUMPS DURING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1737
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1836 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
COMMAND i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VL_SWITCH OPEN COMMAND i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSEDAND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUYT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1738
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1837 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
COMMAND 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC COMMAND 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1739
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1838 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
COMMAND 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC COMMAND 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1740
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:. 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1839 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
COMMAND 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE COMMAND 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B I2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1741
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1840 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE COMMAND 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITYTO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1742
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1841 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO CLOSE THE VALVE. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE OPEN POSITION WHILE THE VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN. FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1743
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1842 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITIONWHILETHE VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL CLOSE. IF THE MDM OPEN COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, OR
THE SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT THE VALVE WILL CYCLE
OPEN AND CLOSED UNTIL THE MDM OR SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS REMOVED,
OR UNTIL THE CONTROL BUS POWER IS REMOVED FROM EITHER OF THE
SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, CREW MUST REMOVE
!POWER FROM EITHER OF THE SWITCH S CLOSE CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPREATIONS, AND WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1744
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1843 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. IF THE
VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATH FAILS, THE VALVE
CANNOT BE OPENED BY THE MDM SWITCH COMMANDS, CAUSING THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
F
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1745
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1844 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS I, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU _SOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1746
w
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1845 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1747
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1846 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _ _
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU_SOL_VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA i
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1748
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER'_BSYSTEMANALYS_SW_RKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1847 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1749
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5,
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1848 ABORT: 3/3
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73ATS26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANYPOSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY
THE MDM COMMAND, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY THE SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY
BY THE MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA u
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1750
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1849 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS AND THE OTHER SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE GPC OR CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE,
AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY MDM COMMAND, ONLY BY THE SWITCH COMMAND.
IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM
COMMAND, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE
WITH THE MDM COMMAND, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM
THE CLOSE CONTACT SET 5,6 THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1751
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1850 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU_ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONOI_T: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LA/_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMM_D. IF THE OPEN ...........
CONTACTS A_ OPEN WH_LE T_C_ IS IN A_Y POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE, AND WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1752
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER-SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1851 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73ATS26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO CLOSE THE VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, OR IF THE MDM CLOSE
COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, THE VALVE WILL CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSED
UNTIL CONTROL BUS POWER TO THE OPEN OR CLOSE CONTACTS IS REMOVED,
OR UNTIL THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND IS REMOVED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1753
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS W0_SHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1852 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, I0
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOLVLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROV_ED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND AND THE MANUAL SWITCH
C0_MAN_D. IF TH_E-G_ CONTACTS FAIL 0_EN, THE VALVE CAN BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, AND
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND UNLESS THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1853 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, I0
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE SWITCH
AND MDM OPEN COMMANDS. FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE AMD LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1755
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1854
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY=
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
12
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM .........
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS _ _ ........
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 11,
i_ _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/_ _:I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S26; $31
]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN
BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1756
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER-SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOR_HEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _ ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1855 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
12
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS. IF THE
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, AND CAN BE CLOSED AND
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, AND LOSS OF THE VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1757
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM."
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY....... HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1856 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORB IT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS23, DS24; PNL 07 DS25, DS26
33V73A7DS23, DS24; DS25, DS26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
AFT L/R RCS CROSSFEED 1/2 & 3/4/5 POSITION INDICATION WOULD
FALSELY SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX VALVES
ARE STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE
WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1857 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV i/2 SWITCH
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS7; PNL 07 DS10
33V73A7DS7; DSI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1759
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSES SMEN-T -
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1858 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _ _ _ ....._ _ _
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/2R AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/ZR
3/ZR
3/ZR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS8, DS9; PNL 07 DSII, DSI2
33V73DS8, DS9; DSII, DSI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW
A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1760
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1859 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] " C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI3-DSI7; PNL 07 DSI8-DS22
33V73A7DSI3-DSI7; DSI8-DS22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
k
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFT RCS MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5 L/R POSITION INDICATION WOULD
FALSELY SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B
VALVES ARE STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION
MISMATCH BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE
WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1761
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1860 ABORT:
ITEM: L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT205; 52V42PT305
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DI??ICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1762
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1861 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:. A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT205; 52V42PT305
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1763
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1862 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT207; 52V42PT307
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1764
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1863 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
B)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER:" 51V42PT207; 52V42PT307
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1765
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1864 ABORT:
L/R ULLAG PPRE   S OR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS S_SOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT206; 52V42PT306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS woRKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1865 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT206; 52V42PT306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICU-LTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1767
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1866 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS sENsoR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J- B_KSMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HD_WI_'NC
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT208; 52V42PT308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I
m
,,m
I
l
mm
i
I
I
g
B
,&
m
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1768
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1867 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX TK
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT208; 52V42PT308 .......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1769
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/2o/e7
ARCS
1868
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R FU TANg _P'I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT203; 52V42TT303
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHESTCRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1869 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
L/R FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
• 6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A C ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT203; 52V42TT303
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANKLEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
=
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1771
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1870 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL coMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT204; 52V42TT304
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1772
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1871 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT204; 52V42TT304
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1773
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1872 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC22
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1774
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1873 ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1775
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1874 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1776
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1875 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1777
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1876 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DO_ELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LL, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILSON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS-FR_FIRINGBY INH-I--BITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BYCLOSING THE APPR--OPRIATE ISO_Tf0%
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1877 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IRPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVERS.
OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL.
DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED
ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. WITH THE LOSS
OF THE GATE SIGNAL TO THE VERNIER DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS, THE
ONORBIT VERNIER JETS ARE UNAVAILABLE. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDV, PROX OPS) CRIT 3/2R. AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1779
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/15/87
SUBSYSTEM : ARCS
MDAC ID: 1878
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 1/LS, RJDA
5) CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132RPC8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HI GHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1879 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALi_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132RPC8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1781
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1880 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
5) CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPCI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1881 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPCI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FoR ATTI_DE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1783
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1882 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
!)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1883 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3. TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPC36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OFTHE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMEN _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1884 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
5) CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
O_O_RBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1885 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI 31RPC23
CAUSES| CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO) .
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1787
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1886 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMSH_DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1887 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1888
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPCI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF _ MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. A FFEC_TS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, AT0),
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1889 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWRREQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1791
IND'.PENDENT ORBITER ASS_SSM_.NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
i/Is/87
ARCS
1890
HIGHEST-CRITICALITY HDW/_C
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 2/1R
_D AN_Y§T: _.A._O'DOm_E_ ST.mSYS _AD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY=
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ 2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL, DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WI_AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1891 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132RPC17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT' MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1892 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER_ _MOTE pOWER
FAILS HIGH ........
LEAD ANALYST:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPC7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE
ISOLATION VALVE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1893 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPC7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS AND LOGIC.
OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL.
DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED
ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. WITH THE LOSS
OF THE GATE SIGNAL TO THE VERNIER DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS, THE
ONORBIT VERNIER JETS ARE UNAVAILABLE. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS) CRIT 3/2R. AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1795
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1894 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A133RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1895 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
3)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1797
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1896
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131RPC21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1897 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A13 IRPC21
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TOMANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSOAVAILABLEFOR - A?TITUD E CONTROL_D_ING_ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTis. _
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1799
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1898 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCIT"
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1899 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT, AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REF
ERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1801
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1900 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
_mm
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1803
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSM_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1902 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CANPREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE
ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1903 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1805
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1904 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IRPC41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS L5LAND L5D MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITE_ _UBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1905 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF L5L AND L5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1807
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1906 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LS, RJDA
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS LSLAND L5D MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS woRKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1907 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
CO_TROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF L5L AND L5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
u
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1809
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1908 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) co mn oLs
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1810
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1909 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGHPROPEL_TS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1811
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1910 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL s sYs Im D: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A3CRI
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAI_BLE FOR ATTITUDE CONT_6_. __G ENTRY, _SSDI_THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1812
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1911 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[ F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL _NOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1813
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1912 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD i, RJDA
5) DIODE
6)
7)
8)
9 ) CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32A2CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION___ MAY=AFFEC _
_NT _F_BE_ENTHE _O DIFFERENT B-USES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER
JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS _DBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1814
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
-- DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1913 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
w
i
w
i
i
w
w
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY S, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR7
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING ABORTS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, THE
LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1815
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1914 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/Ft_C - ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTO I_F: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3_/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAICR4 .............
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CUP_R_E_N_TFLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT S_I-NG. THE 1.2_
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _ ......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1915 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
•PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDV, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1817
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1916
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1818
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1917 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1819
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1918 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1919 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
5) DIODE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1821
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1920 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
5) " DIODE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32A2CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT_ FLOW BE_EN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES_ DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1822
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1921 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132A2CR8
B [F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER
JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1823
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1922 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1923 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1825
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1924
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
IX)CATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1826
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/15/87
ARCS
1925
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132AICR3
B [F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK _DING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1827
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1926 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDU_.DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK .....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1927 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR8
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1829
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1928
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
3)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1929 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWERLATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1831
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1930 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY _Os DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1832
mm
B
mm
z
m
I
i
mm
m
I
I
mm
I
b -
m
l
m
ww
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1931 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33A2 CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1833
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:......
MDAC ID: 1932 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIOD_
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO-DIFFERENT BusEs. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1834
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1933 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS _ ALSO AVAILAB_IfE FOR ATTTTUDE _C_)_TROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1835
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1934 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1836
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1935 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4]
5)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETs ARE ALSO AVAILABLEFOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1837
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1936
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
mmm
m
m
m
mm
g
i
m
I
m
J
i
mm
mm
m
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1937 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1839
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1938 ABORT:
 DW/ C
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMA_
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT _COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE_Q ............_ _ _
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1840
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1939 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: • AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A131A3CR8
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1841
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1940 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LO_ATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
S4V76AI 3IA2 CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1842
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1941 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A2CRI
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CGSAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1843
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/1s/B7
ARCS
1942
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND _NT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPEL_T
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70"943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1844
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1943 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
211R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132A2CRI
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL, DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1845
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/i5/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1944 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
5) DIODE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133A3 CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED
PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1846
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
I
MDAC ID: 1945 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1847
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1946 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTEDDIODEALLOWS__RED_N_T CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1947 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1849
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1948 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1949 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132AICR2
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS' AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1851
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1950 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1951 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55VT6AI32AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1853
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1952 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133A3 CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PT!s. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER
JETS. AFFECTS JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1854
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1953 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER
JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1855
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1954 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1955 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR4
B IF] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1857
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1956 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENTFLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT S_ING. THE 1.2K CU_ENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
suBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1957 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A1CR3
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1859
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1958 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33A3 CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS _DUNDANTCIRCUIT OPE_TION. MAY AFFECT
C_NT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TOUNE_UAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CUR_NT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER
JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1860
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1959 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DO_NNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP
DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1861
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1960
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYSLEAD"D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 '_
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS RED_UN=D_ANT _IRC_T qPERATIO_ MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _ _ _ _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/lS/87
ARCS
1961
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL, DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1863
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1962 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT S_ING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1963 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4," PCA 1
54V76AI31AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1865
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1964 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_TS TO MEETTHE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1866
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1965 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1867
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1966 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 3, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPE_TION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1868
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1967 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 3, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILAB_ FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1869
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1968 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BusEs, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
_=_ _?_ i_ii _ _ _ _ _ _i _ _ _i _ _
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/i5/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1969 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87
J
C-1871
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1970 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTE_ DIODE AL_WSREDU_D_CIRCU!T OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TQ_ _
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CU_ENT S_ING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1971 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1873
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1972 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC .....ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. _IDrEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFF-ECT ANY SCHEDULEDENTRY DTOs OR PTIs' DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1874
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER_ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111s/87
ARCS
1973
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [ F] ......
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1875
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1974
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BE_EN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MAN!FOLDWLILL A--FFECT-_ _ SCHEDULED-EN-_YDTOS OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1876
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1975 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETYBOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1877
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1976 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131A3CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT ON CIRCUIT OPERATION.
PROTECT OTHER CIRCUIT.
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR WILL
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1878
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1977 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131A3CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF LSL AND LSD VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF V--ERNIER
RCS.
m
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1879
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1978 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRIT!CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI31A3CR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT ON CIRCUIT OPERATION.
PROTECT OTHER CIRCUIT.
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR WILL
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1979 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76A13 IA3 CR3
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF R5R AND R5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1881
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1980
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CO_LS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1981 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J9-46 TYPE II
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK,
REPORT DATE 03/22/87
i
C-1883
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/8-7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC "ID: 1982 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT. .....
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1983 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
211R
312R
312R
3/2R
A[2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1885
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1984 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23ARJ9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CH-ECKOUT, .....
REFERENCES:V_-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSM %T
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1985 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1887
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1986 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THECREW--CANPREVENTJETS FROMFIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1987 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1889
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1988
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: B.A. O'DONNELL
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P ] ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR'J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS ?ROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT. -....
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1989 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1891
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1990 ABORT:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
ITEM:
FAILUREMODE:
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1991 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). _FFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS KANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1893
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1992 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76A121AR J9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1993 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1994 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J9-45 (182) TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1995 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J9-45 (182) TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1897
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1996 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS LSLAND LSD MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1997 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/2 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A121AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF L5L AND L5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1899
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1998 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD RL, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_c ....... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRErLAUNCH: 3/3 rRTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [.. ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
POWERSUPPLIEDTO VERNIERJETSRSRAND RSD MANIFOL_D_VER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER COMSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1999 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF R5R AND R5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2000 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J6-K TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS RSRAND RSD MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER COMSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1902
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iNDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2001 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-K TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF RSR AND RSD VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
=
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1903
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD RS, RJDA
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J6-X TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS RSR AND RSD MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER COMSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
5) DRIVER, HYBRID
6)
7)
8)
S)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-X TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF RSR AND RSD VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3120187 C-1905
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AISF8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5F6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1907
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 2A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2/4, RJDA
FUSE, 2A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14"$4
33V73AI4F9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ABLE TO SWITCH RJDA BUS A POWER. LOSS OF 1 OF 2 PWR SOURCES
TO MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 4 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF A MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ABORT CRITICALITY IS 3/3 SINCE THE
POWER LATCHING RELAY WAS SWITCH TO "ON" PRIOR TO LIFTOFF (OPS-9).
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1908
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2007 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 2A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
S)
_)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/3, RJDA
FUSE, 2A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AISF7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ABLE TO SWITCH RJDA BUS B POWER. LOSS OF 1 OF 2 PWR SOURCES
TO MANIFOLDS 1 AND 3 DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS
ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ABORT CRITICALITY IS 3/3 SINCE THE
POWER LATCHING RELAY WAS SWITCHED TO "ON" PRIOR TO LIFTOFF (OPS-
9). AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1909
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AI5F4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 _GIC POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. IF BOTH LOGIC
POWER INPUTS AND _TCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. D_ _ENTRY, THE ....
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1910
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2009 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AI5F5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 LOGIC POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. IF BOTH LOGIC
POWER INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. DURING ENTRY, THE
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSSOF-A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1911
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2010 A_RT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
_SE, IA
FAI_ OPEN
T._AD _ALYST: R.A. O'DONNE_ SUBSYS 7._AD: D.J. PAUL
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) ET._CTRI_L COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTRO_
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
M_IFOLD 2, _DA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEO_IT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4F4
CAUSES: CO_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THE_AL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS _ A_O AVAI_B_ FOR ATTI_DE CONTROL. D_ING ENTRY, _SS
OF THE M_IFOLD WILL AFFECT _Y SCHEDU_D ENTRY _Os OR PTIs.
D_ING RT_, THE _SS OF A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_TS TO MEET THE
T_ _DING CONST_INTS _D CG SAFETY BO_D_IES DUE TO THE
T_PPED PROPEL_ WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPE_TIONS
(_DZ, PRox OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP _NGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
_FE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE S_TTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $3
33V73AI4F2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (_DZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1913
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2012 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4F3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1914
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $3
33V73AI4F1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1915
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2014 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2/3/4, RJDA
FUSE, 2A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2 R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6F5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ABLE TO SWITCH RJDA BUS C POWER. LOSS OF 1 OF 2 PWR SOURCES
TO MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4 DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF A MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. D_ING RTLS, THE _SS OF A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ABORT CRITICALITY IS 3/3 SINCE
THE POWER LATCHING RELAY WAS SWITCHED TO "ON" PRIOR TO LIFTOFF
(OPS-9). AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1916
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2015 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
FUSE, 1A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6F4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS' OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD(SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1917
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/5R, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $4
33V73AI6F3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... ....
LOSS OF i OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6F2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 LOGIC POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. IF BOTH LOGIC
POWER INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. DURING ENTRY, THE
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
ONORBIT. THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1919
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
311R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R _
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R _:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $3
33V73AI6FI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
LO$_ OF_O_ 2 LQG_C PO__ SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER M_IFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. _B__C ....
POWER INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. DURING ENTRY, THE
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ........
ONORBIT. THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROP OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1920
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INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2019 A_RT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
_SE, IA
FAI_ OPEN
_D _ALYST: R.A. O'DO_E_ SUBSYS _AD: D.J. PAUL
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTRO_
T_USTER SUBSYSTEM
M_IFOLD 4, _DA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
_TION:
P_T _MBER:
PNL O14 $6
33V73AI4F8
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS _ A_O AVAI_B_ FOR ATTI_DE CONTROL. D_ING ENTRY, _SS
OF THE M_IFOLD WILL AFFECT _ SCHEDUT._D ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
D_ING RT_, THE _SS OF A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_TS TO MEET THE
T_K _DING CONST_INTS _D CG SAFETY BO_D_IES DUE TO THE
T_PPED PROPEL_T WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPE_TIONS
(_DZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP _NGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
_FE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE S_TTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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_PORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1921
uDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2020 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $5
33V73A14F6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1922
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2021 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $6
33V73AI4F7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO_, ........................................
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1923
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_CS FLIGHT:
2022 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
_SE, IA
FAI_ OPEN
_D _ALYST: R.A. O'DO_ELL SUBSYS _D: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
E_CTRI_L COMPO_S
CONTRO_
T_USTER SUBSYSTEM
M_IFO_ 4, _DA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION: PNL O14 $5
P_T_MBER: 33V73AI4F5
B [P] C [ P]
_USES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: ................
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGI_ AND'DRIVER :
CIR_ITS. O_ER M_IFOLD JETS _ ALSO AVAI_B_ FOR ATTITUDE
CON_OL. D_ING ENTRY, _SS OF THIS M_IFOLD WILL AFFECT _Y
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SCHEDUT._D ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RT_, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD _IX PRIVY JETS_ WIL_ CA___T=:?_L __
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (_DZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2023 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
312R
211R
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2/4, RJDA
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31 LATCHING RELAY K1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCES FROM FWD MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 4 DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY
DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF AN AFT MANIFOLD (6
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1925
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2024 ABORT:
HDW/F C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2/4, RJDA
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31 LATCHING RELAY K1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN-A POWER TO AFT
MANIFOLDS i, 2V _D 4 DRIVER CIR_ITS. NO EFFECT, SINCE POWER
CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE CORRESPONDING MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES.
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REFE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2025 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/3, RJDA
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCES FROM AFT MANIFOLDS 1 AND 3 DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF AN AFT MANIFOLD (6 PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1927
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2026 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/3, RJDA
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN-B POWER TO AFT
MANIFOLDS 1 AND 3 DRIVER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT, SINCE POWER CAN
STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE CORRESPONDING MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2027 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2/3/4, RJDA
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCES FROM AFT MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4 DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY
DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF AN AFT MANIFOLD (6
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1929
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3_
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2/3/4, RJDA
LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN uC POWER=TO AFT ......
MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4 DRIVER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT, SINCE POWER
CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE CORRESPONDING MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-I06
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1931
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS :
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21R J4-i06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2031 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1933
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2032 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O[DONNE_LL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1934
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2033 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1935
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2034 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI3 IAIRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1936
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2035 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRI0
.B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1937
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2036 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ......... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1938
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2037 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRII
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1939
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2038 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 .
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] .........
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76Ai32AIRI 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1940
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
ARCS
2039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2/4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR7
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
r
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1941
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/2/4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1942
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2041 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76A132AIR15
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1943
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2042 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
x)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI32AIRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1944
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2043 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR47
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
i
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1945
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2044 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
R.A. o'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/2R
312R
322R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] c[p]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SiX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH _
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS _AND LATCHINGS!GNALS FAIL OF F, LOS=_ OF M_IFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE _SS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTO@ _D PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1946
I
I
B
mm
l
g
B
I
m
E
|
m
z
[]
I
I
m
__=
[_
I
mm
?m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2045 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1947
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B.A. O'DONNELL
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2046 ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
BRE DO HIE aCHY:
i)  U CTRiCAL COMPONE S
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD I/LL, RJDA
5) RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ 2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIF_D
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) _ WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1948
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2047 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ..] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI 3IAIRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1949
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 _ HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2048 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1950
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2049 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1951
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2050 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABOR T
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ ] C [ ] : :
LOCATION:
PART _MBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2051 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1953
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2052 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2053 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1955
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2054 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI3 IAIR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2055 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B E0 B12, JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1957
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2056 ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
.....CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUN C
3/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1958
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2057 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREEN.S" A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132AIR19
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
W
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1959
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS • FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2058 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
313
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1960
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOP/_SHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2059 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIR20
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1961
INDEPENDENT oRBITER-A__
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2060 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1962
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2061 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AIR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
L:
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1963
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/i5/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2062 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'_ONNELL suBsYsIm D:D.J.PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIRI
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTSq_ND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1964
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2063 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1965
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD _ALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS 7,_AD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, _DA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_ : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 ....
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
P_T_MBER: 56V76AI33AIR36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OV_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BT_ED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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_FE_NCES: VS70-943099 _V B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE S_TTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
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_PORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1966
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YS TEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2065 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1967
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2066 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1968
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2067 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
W..
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1969
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2068 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2069 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1971
n
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2070 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNEL L
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
FLIGHT PKASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR39
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1972
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2071 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [.. ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
t
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1973
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2072 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-i04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK ....
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1974
w
g
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2073 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
i
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1975
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2074 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: .3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/30/87 C-1976
i
J
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2075 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR27
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1977
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2076 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1978
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2077 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
_)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR28
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1979
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHESTCRITICALITYk_
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2078 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1980
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2079 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1981
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2080 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1982
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2081 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
e)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIR30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1983
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2082 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: . A [ B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1984
_m
I
LINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2083 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
•LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI 3IAIR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1985
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2084 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c.c ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1986
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2085 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1987
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2086 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIR32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK N
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1988
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2087 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2/3/4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A133AIR16
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWRON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1989
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 _ HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2088 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2/3/4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
P_T NUMBER" 56V76AI33AiRi6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1990
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_KSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2089 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-i06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
= :
w
L_
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1991
D
INDEPENDENT .......ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2090 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-i06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
r_
i
i
m
[]
i
g
mm
g
m
i
m
mm
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2091 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.SK 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1993
b
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1115187
ARCS
2092
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
!) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON"kS!GNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1994
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2093 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1995
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2094 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1996
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2095 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1997
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2096 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OPEN RESISTOR 0R DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL 077, _SS O? MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPE_TIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
RE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1998
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERASUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2097 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1999
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2098 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2000
R
Im
rINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2099 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2001
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2100 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
!)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI 32AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70"943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2002
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2101 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2003
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDACID: 2102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2005
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2006
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2007
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2106
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2008
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2009
_m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2108 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2010
m
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR51
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2011
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2110 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT_ 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCESi VS70'943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2012
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2111 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCk 3
56V76AI33AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO 0A INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m_
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2013
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2112 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2014
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ].. B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AIR49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2015
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2114 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2016
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AiR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2017
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2116 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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u
ww
m
w
W
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2019
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2118 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2119 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20187 C-2021
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2120 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P_ ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2022
u
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI3 IAIRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87
J
C-2023
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
e)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2024
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2025
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2124 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, ]_CA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2026
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B.[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23RI41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWRON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2027
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2126 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23RI41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR2 "
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2029
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS
AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2030
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AIR44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2031
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/1s/87
ARCS
2131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWRON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2033
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2132 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2034
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2i33 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR40
B C ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87
i
C-2035
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2134 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDw/F_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBT T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
l
I
[]
I
mm
I
m
u
I
m
m
m
M
m
m
m
m
u
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2135 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
AT O: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR41
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2037
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2136 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3-
56V76AI33AIR41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK []
g
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2038
mm
u
um
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2137 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2039
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2139 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2041
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/lS/8v
ARCS
2140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2141 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2043
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2142 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A13 IAIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2143 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
•REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR42
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2045
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2144 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2046
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2145 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
J
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2047
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER ..........................SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2146 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2147 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
T)
e)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD RS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
DNORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2049
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/1s/8v
ARCS
2148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD RS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITE_SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2149 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD RS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] .C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J2-11
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2051
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2150 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD RS, RJDA
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [.. ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22R J2-11
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2052
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/L5/RI, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD
LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM
RJDA BUS A AND B ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A AND B.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2053
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2152 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........ _
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND B BY THE L4/R4
AND L3/RS/L3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES, RESPECTIVELY. THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DIRVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD AND
POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND C, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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INDEPENDENT _ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2153 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2055
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2154 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM MANIFOLD LI/ 5/RI AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS _DBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 il
=_
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2056
is
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOPd(SHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDLTN'DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73A15S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2057
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2156 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.I0, RCS SIG 2
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2157 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AISS4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2059
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2158 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LL/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB L1/LL/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AILS4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION , VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS B BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS B. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2060
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2159 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/L5/RI, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 015 $4
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S4
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS B POWER FROM RJDA
BUS B DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2061
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2160 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS B IS PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS B POWER IS ALSO
PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L1/L5/R1 AND THE L3/R5/R3
MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS B.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2062
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2161 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
9, I0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AISS4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2063
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2162 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
9, i0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
L_N-_NG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73A15S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM MANIFOLD L1/ 5/RI AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2064
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/L5/RI, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ll.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2065
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2164 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS II, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 015 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
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REFERENCES: VS_0-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSCli174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii,i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2066
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
ARCS
2165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
13, 14
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AISS4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2067
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2166 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
13, 14
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3%3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS A BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2068
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2167 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 15,
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
16
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/L5/RI, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 152 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 015 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS A POWER FROM RJDA
BUS A DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ll.10, RCS SIG 2
J
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2069
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2168 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 15, 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/L5/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $4
33V73AI5S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS A POWER IS
ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE LI/LS/RI, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WiLL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2070
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2169 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/L5/Ri, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AI5S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY _MOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
ABI AND AB2. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FORM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED
POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
REMOVE LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD LI/LS/RI, AND WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2071
i
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2170 ABORT:
ITEM: RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/LS/RI, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL O15 S3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD AND
MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS, AND ABORT
DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
z
I
g
u
i
i
i
m
mm
mm
g
i
i
mm
I
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 mw
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2072
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2171 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AISS3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE
RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE LI/L5/RI
MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2073
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2172 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LL/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART hUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AI5S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE M_FOLD B_ PLA_ING TH_
LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUND_CY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD LI/LL/R1 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPEPATTONS, ...... -
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REFE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2074
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2173 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AI5S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2075
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2174 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AI5S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
l
w_
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2076
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2175 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AISS3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE LI/L5/R1 MANIFOLDAND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 03122187 C-2077
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2176 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AISS3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD LI/LS/RI AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2078
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2177 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTSFAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD LI/LS/RI, RJDAIB
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AISS3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2079
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2178 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/LS/R1, RJDAIB
RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $3
33V73AI5S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2080
w
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2179 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREE/qS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73A14S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA
BUS A AND C ONLY BY REWMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A AND C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CASE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND C.
m
i
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii'i0, RCS SIG 2
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2081
INDEPENDENT_ORBITER ASSESSME_ _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2180 ABORT:
ITEM" RJDA1A L2/_2 M_IFOLD DRIVER S_H
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS A BY THE L4/R4 AND
LI/LS/L! MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY FOR POWER TO RJDA
BUS C IS PROVIDED BY TRHE L3/R5/R3 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR THE DRIVER POWER.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE MANIFOLD AND POWER_TO RJDA BUS B AND C, AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2082
mm
wB
i
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2181 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
i
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2083
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2182 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON swITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73Ai4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM MANIFOLD L2/R2 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 E
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2084
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2183 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: I/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2085
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2184 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[- ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
z
m
I
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2086
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2185 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEADANALYST:V.J.B R MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE LDI/LS/RI AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2087
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2186 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS A BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2088
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2187 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS A POWER FROM RJDA
BUS A DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC ii174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ll.10, RCS SIG 2
L
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2089
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2188 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L4/R4 AND THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS A
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE LI/LS/RI, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2090
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2189 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
i0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2091
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2190 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON swITcH coNTAcTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM MANIFOLD L2/R2 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2092
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC.
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2191 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2093
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87
ARCS
2192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL C_SED (SHORTED).
_AD ANALYST: V.J. BUR_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTRO_
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2094
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2193 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
13, 14
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2095
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2194 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
13, 14
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS C BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS C.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2096
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2195 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
15, 16
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS C POWER FROM RJDA
BUS C DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2097
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2196 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
15, 16
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $4
33V73AI4S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS C IS PROVIDED BY THE L4/R4 AND THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS C
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L2/R2, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L3/RS/R3 MANIVOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE _SS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2098
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2197 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY REMOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
CA1 AND CA2. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L2/R2, AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS..
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2099
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2198 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP
LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2100
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2199 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS I,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE
RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L2/R2 _
MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBI"I _ OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIG_ST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
_CS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2200 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAIL_ MODE:
_DAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD _GIC ON SWIT_ CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL C_SED (SHORTED).
_._AD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS t_AD: D.J. PAUL
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
.9)
i) E_CTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD L2/R2, _DAIA
_DAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD _GIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
_TION:
P_T _MBER:
PNL O14 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, ME_I_L SHOCK, THE_AL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: _ _ _
DRIVER PO_R _ BE _MOVED FROM T_ _IFOLD BY P_C_G _
L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE C_SED _SITION. FAILURE OF
A_ _D_DANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO _MOVE _GIC AND
DRIVER PO_R FROM _IFOLD L4/R4 _MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPE_TIONS.
_FE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
S_TT_ SYSTEMS _DBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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_PORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2102
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2201 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $3"
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2103
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2202 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O14 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2104
I
mDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2203 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L1/LS/RI AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN
THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_S TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2105
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2204 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
3)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 W
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2106
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2205 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2107
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2206 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $3
33V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2108
w
g
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD
LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM
RJDA BUS B AND C ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS B AND C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2109
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2208 ABORT:
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/I
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES .....
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/ C
i/i
2/2
2/2
2/2
c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONS:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS B BY THE LI/LS/LI
MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. REDUNDANCY FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS C
PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES.
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE
MANIFOLD AND POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND C, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2110
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2209 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
=
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2111
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2210 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $4
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S4
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2 g
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2112
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2211 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2113
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
HI
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2114
m
z
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2213 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, P.JDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2115
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2214 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS B BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS B. FAILUR_ OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA B.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2116
W
mm
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2215 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] CC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS B POWER FROM P.JDA
BUS B DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
=
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2216 ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS B IS PROVIDED BY THE LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS B POWER IS ALSO
PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L1/LS/RI AND THE L3/R5/R3
MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2118
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1127187 HIGHEST cRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 312R
2217 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
9, i0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2119
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2218 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
9, i0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD LOGIc SWITCH IN THE C_SED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 g
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2120
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2121
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER"
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2122
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2221 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
13, 14
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/2R
3/2R AOA: 3/2R
3/2R ATO: 3/2R
3/3
A[ 2 ] B[P] C CP]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP
LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS
OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2222 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
13, 14
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BEREMOVED FROM RJDA BUS C BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA B.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2124
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATEz 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 15, 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS C POWER FROM RJDA
BUS C DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 15, 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $4
33V73AI6S4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS C IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS C POWER IS
ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L2/R2, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2126
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
v/
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $3
33V73AI6S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY REMOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
BCI AND BC2. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED
POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
REMOVE LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L3/RS/R3, AND WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2226 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $3
33V73AI6S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD AND
MAY _FECT_ORBIT OPERATION_ _ DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT ....
DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ANOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii,I0, RCS SIG 2 U
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2128
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2227 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S3
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE RESULTS
IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD
AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2228 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, _DA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $3
33V73AI6S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER pO_R C_ BE REMOVED FROM THE M_IFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/R5/L3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L3/RS/R3 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2229 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $3
33V73A16S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3120187 C-2131
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2230 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $3
33V73AI6S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
J
ms
==.
mm
[]
l
m
mm
mm
i
i
M
I
I
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2132
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2231 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $3
33V73AI6S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2232 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $3
33V73AI6S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POUR _BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/RS/L3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
MANIFOLD POWER FROM MANIFOLD L3/R5/R3 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
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REF_NCES: VS_0_943099 REV B _0 B12, CP_ JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2134
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2233 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S3
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2234 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $3
33V73AI6S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 HI
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2136
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2235 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA
BUS A AND C ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A NAD C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11,10, RCS SIG 2
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2137
INDEPENDENTORBITER AssEssMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2236 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/i
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER sUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
E_CTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/ 2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A i ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $6
33V73A14S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS A ANDB BY THE L2/R2
AND L1/LS/L1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. _D_DANCY FOR POWER TO
RJDA BUS C PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR LOSS OF DRIVER POWER.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE MANIFOLD AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND C, AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2138
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2237 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY AF?ECT 0%6RBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2139
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBsYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2238 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,
2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS HAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
oNORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] _C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73A14S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER P0_R C__BE REMOVED FROMTHE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE ......
L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION_ FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099REV B EO BI_-, cP;_Sc 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS_=_DBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2140
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2239 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2240 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
m
mm
z
I
l
B
Q
8
mm
mm
u
m
g
I
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2142
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2241 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2242 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS C BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA-BUS C. ...........................
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE sYsTEMs HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2144
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
ARCS
2243
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
5) RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS C POWER FROM P.JDA
BUS C DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2145
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2244 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTSFAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCYTO PREVENT REMOVAL OV RJDA BUS C
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE L2/RS, THE L4/R4, AND THE L3/R5/R3
MANIVOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2146
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2245 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
I0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2246 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i0
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2247 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
] B [ ] C.[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2149
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2248 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
Ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS II, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2150
g
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2249
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
13, 14
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDINGfSAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L1/LS/RIAND THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2250 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
13, 14
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i_, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS A BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.I0, RCS SIG 2
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REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2152
u
I
wm_m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2251 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
15, 16
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $6
33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS A POWER FROM RJDA
BUS A DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2252 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
15, 16
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73A14S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE4 LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS A
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE LI/LS/RI, THE
L2/R2, AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESET IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A.I
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WoRKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2253 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $5
33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY REMOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
CA2 AND CA3. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILLCAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4, AND WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2155
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2254 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] ....
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP
LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
l
M
mm
m
ms
I
m
i
mm
l
I
w
W
m
J
B
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2156
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2255 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $5
33"V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE RESULTS
IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND
MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2157
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2256 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS I,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L4/R4 ........ DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOP/KSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2257 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICAiITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V73A14S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II,i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2159
i
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2258 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICAL_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $5
33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL _
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS _NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFE_NCES: VS70-943099m_V B EO B12,CP;JSC 11174,SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2259 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
312R
312R
312R
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN
THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2161
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
2260 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS S, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE _MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2261 ABORT: 3/3
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2262 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $5
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 im
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2263 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIB MANIFOLD LI/RI/L5 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L1/RI/LS, RJDAIB
RJDAIB MANIFOLD L1/R1/L5 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD
PART NUMBER: MANIFOLD LI/RI/L5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN
BE DONE ON CRITICAL JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2165
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2264 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDAIAMANIFOLD L2/R2 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L2/R2, RJDAIA
RJDAIA MANIFOLD L2/R2 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD
PART NUMBER: MANIFOLD L2/R2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN
BE DONE ON CRITICAL JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2166
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2265 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDA2B MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUM"ENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L3/R3/RS, RJDA2B
RJDA2B MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD
MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN
BE DONE ON CRITICAL JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03127187 C-2167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2266 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDA2AMANIFOLD L4/R4 TRICKLE TEST
FAILURE MODE: TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A
RJDA2A MANIFOLD L4/R4 TRICKI_ TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD
MANIFOLD L4/R4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN
BE DONE ON CRITICAL JETS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
mm
mm
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2168
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2267 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RCS ACTIVITY LIGHTS
FAILURE MODE: LIGHTS FAIL OFF OR ON.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
RCS ACTIVITY LIGHTS
RCS ACTIVITY LIGHTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD
PART NUMBER: ALL MANIFOLDS
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW HAS NO VISUAL INDICATION WHAT AXIS AND DIRECTIONS JETS ARE
FIRING IN OR IF THE ELEVON DRIVE RATE IS SATURATED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2268 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT210, 51V42PT209; 52V42PT310, 52V42PT309
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE CREW AND
GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY _
MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2170
u
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER _[TBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT2i0, 51V42PT209; 52V42PT310, 52V42PT309
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE CREW AND
GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY
MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2171
J
UINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2270 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT212, 51V42PT217; 52V42PT312, 52V42PT317
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT212, 51V42PT217; 52V42PT312, 52V42PT317
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2272 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU M_IFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT219, 51V42PT214; 52V42PT319, 52V42PT314
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2174
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT219, 51V42PT214; 52V42PT319, 52V42PT314
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2175
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2274 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT216, 51V42PT221; 52V42PT316, 52V42PT321
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2176
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/87
ARCS
2275
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT216, 51V42PT221; 52V42PT316, 52V42PT321
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2177
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2276 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OXMANIFO_ 1 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX
L/R OX MANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT208; 52V42TT308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE GROUND AND
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE
BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2178
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT__
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/87
ARCS
2277
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OXMANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX
L/R OX MANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT208; 52V42TT308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE GROUND AND
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE
BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2278 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX _IFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERA_ THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUB SYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX
L/R OX MANIFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT2XX; 52V42TT3XX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEMi ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2279 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OXMANIFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX
5) L/R OX MANIFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT2XX; 52V42TT3XX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
L
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 _ HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2280 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE:
L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA,
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
R3A
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, AFT
L/_ CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A; 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2281 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS _[A, _
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
R3A
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, AFT
L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A; 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2183
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2282 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA,
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
R3A
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, AFT
L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/ROMS POD, RCSMANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A; 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDA]_CYMANAi2EMENT WILL ANNOUNCE_fEJET AS FAILE_ON, BUT
WILL NOT DESELECT THE JET.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2283 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, L/R
5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,
L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42EN L4L;
52V42ENRIL, 52V42ENR2L, 52V42ENR3L, 52V42ENR4L
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2284 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R C_MBER P_SS_ (Pc) SENSOR, T_USTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAIL_ MODE: INDI_TES _R P_SS_ T_ A_AL.
T_AD _YST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS _D: D.J. PAUL
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) ET._CTRI_L COMPONE_S
2 ) INSTRUME_ATION
3) T_USTER SUBSYSTEM
4) T_USTERS, L/R
5) L/R C_BER P_SS_ (Pc) SENSOR,
L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
6)
7)
8)
9)
_USTE_ LIL, L2L, L3L,
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P_ _CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEO_IT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
_TION: L/R OMS POD, RCS M_IFO_S _D T_USTERS
PUT _MBER: 5iV42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42EN L4L;
52V42E_IL, 52V42E_2L, 52V42E_3L, 52V42E_4L
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THE_AL
SHOCK, OVE_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_ :
_D_D_CY _AGEMENT WILL DESET._CT THE JET _D _O_CE IT AS
FAIT._D OFF.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2285
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
z
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, L/R
5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,
L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42EN L4L;
52V42ENRIL, 52V42ENR2L, 52V42ENR3L, 52V42ENR4L
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2286 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
L5D, R5R, R5D
FAILURE MODE:
L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL,
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
R5D
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L, LSD, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5L, 51V42ENL5D, 51V42ENRSR, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THER_MAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
2287 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
L5D, RSR, RSD
FAILURE MODE:
L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL,
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
RSD
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL, L5D, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5L, 51V42ENLSD, 51V42ENRSR, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2288 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL,
LSD, RSR, RSD
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, L/R
5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL, L5D, R5R,
R5D
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42ENLSL, 51V42ENL5D, 51V42ENR5R, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2289 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, UP/DOWN
5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,
L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D; 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2290 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, UP/DOWN
5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,
L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
6)
7)
8)
s)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D; 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2291 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, UP/DOWN
5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,
L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D; 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2292 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA,
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B_MPER SUBSYS LEAD: D,J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
R3A
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, AFT
L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A, 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
2293 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
R3A
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, AFT
L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA, L3A, RIA,
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A, 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIG_ST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2294 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX OR _ INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, T_USTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAIL_ MODE: INDICATES HIG_R TEMPE__ T_ AC_AL.
T._AD _ALYST: V.J. BU_MPER SUBSYS _AD: D.J. PAUL
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) ET._CTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) T_USTER SUBSYSTEM
4) T_USTERS, L/R
5) L/R OX OR _ INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, T_USTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,
L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS M_IFOLDS _D T_USTERS
P_T _MBER: 51V42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42ENL4L,
52V42E_IR, 52V42E_2R, 52V42E_3R, 52V42E_4R
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
C_W MAY M_ BAD DECISION BASED ON E_ONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 _V B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE S_TTLE
SYSTEMS _DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2295 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, L/R
5) L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,
L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL!L, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42ENL4L,
52V42ENRIR, 52V42ENR2R, 52V42ENR3R, 52V42ENR4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORK_ET
DATE: 1/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2296
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
LSD, RSR, RSD
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L,
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
R5D
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L, L5D, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLSL, 51V42ENLSD, 51V42ENR5R, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/87
ARCS
2297
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
L5D, R5R, R5D
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
RSO
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL, LSD, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5L, 51V42ENL5D, 51V42ENRSR, 51V42ENRSD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2298 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, UP/DOWN
5) L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,
L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D, 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONA Z: n
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2299 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) THRUSTERS, UP/DOWN
5) L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4Ui
L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D, 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2201
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2300 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR JII-F; JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE, _ _
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORB IT: 3/ IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR JII-F; JII-G
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2203
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2302 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
I/I
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-H; Jll-I
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2303 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JI1-H; Jll-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2304 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR Jll-F; AR JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2305 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR JII-F; AR JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2207
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWO_SHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2306 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR JII-H TYPE III; AR Jll-I (181) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2307 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR JII-H TYPE III; AR Jll-I (181) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
w REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2209
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2308 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS _: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A!23AR J8-73 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT OR RIGHT MANIFOLD 5.
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J8-73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS. VERNIER
THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2211
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
_SE, IA
FAI_ OPEN
_AD _ALYST: W.A. _UFT._.R SUBSYS _AD: D.J. PAUL
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ET_CTRICAL COMPONENTS
T_USTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
M_IFOLD 1 JETS
FUSE, IA
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE__: 3/3 RT_: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
_TION:
P_T _MBER:
PNL AI4 $9
36V73AI4F27
mUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2311 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SI0
36V73AI4F28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2213
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
FUSE, IA
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SII
36V73AI4F29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2313 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S12
36V73AI4F30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2215
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2314 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4F31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD 5. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
B
B
m
mm
i
I
u
l
m
i
B
g
J
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
FUSE, 5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23F
,CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT OR RIGHT MANIFOLD 5.
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2316 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C[P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, L3A; 52V42ENRIA, R3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITY. PROPELLANT WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS
DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
B
mm
I
B
I
i
I
J
m
i
I
z
g
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY' Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
R4R
L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; 52V42ENRIR, R2R, R3R,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87
ARCS
2318
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/i 
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, L2U, L2U, L2D, L3D, L4D; 52V42ENRiU,
R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D;
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FI_IH THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET's
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, L3A; 52V42ENRIA, R3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND WILL AFFECT THE +X JET
RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITY. PROPELLANT WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS
DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2320 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
E_CTRI_A_ COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
R4R
L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; 52V42ENRIR, R2R, R3R,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_
RED_DANCY PRQYI_ED BY T_USTE_RS WHICH FIRE IN T_ SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY D_iNG ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHIC_ DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2222
mm
D
i
l
m
l
m
u
l
I
l
D
mm
l
mm
i
mm
mm
iw
L
W
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2321 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, L2U, L2U, L2D, L3D, L4D; 52V42ENRIU,
R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME,
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2223
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
VERNIER MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
51V42ENL5D; 51V42ENLSL; 52V42ENRSD; 52V42ENRSR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR VERNIER JETS. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET
WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS,
THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET. FAILURE WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2323 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
VERNIER MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5D; 51V42ENLSL; 52V42ENR5D; 52V42ENRSR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR VERNIER JETS. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET
WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS,
THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET. FAILURE WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2225
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: -- 1/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2324
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TAI/(BACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2226
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
S)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03127187 C-2227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2326 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, ExcE_ BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TALKBACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2228
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2327 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2229
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2328 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC T
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT M_!FOLD 3 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TALKBACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2230
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2329 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2330 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TALKBACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2331 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2233
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2332
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TALKBACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER EUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2333 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2334 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS --.
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
51V42ENLIA, L3A; RIA, R3A
CAUSES: CO_AMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND WILL AFFECT THE +X JET
RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITY. PROPELLANT WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS
DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95 m
B
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2236
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2335 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] c[P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, L3A; RIA, R3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURECONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROP_LANTS COULD CAU&_EZOTS, L_ADING_-LOSS D?VEHICLEIN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2237
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2336 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2337 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS, LEADING TO LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2239
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2338 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU , L2U, L4U, L2D , L3D, L4D; RIU, R2U, R4U,
R2D, R3D, R4D
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION_ _-PR__T IN THIS_E_-_ILL_FREEZE_ONORBiT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2339 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
R2D, R3D, R4D
L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
51V42ENLIU, L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D; RIU, R2U, R4U,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS, LEADING TO LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-224!
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2340 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: " L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: SlV42ENLSD; RSD ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR VERNIER JETS. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET
WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS,
THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET. FAILURE WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2242
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2341 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/iR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5D; R5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS, LEADING TO LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2342 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC ......
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $9
36V73AI4S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF P-ROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2244
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $9
36V73AI4S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
OPERATIONS ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2344 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
4)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: .2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $9
36V73A14S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RSIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2246
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2345 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS 1, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $9
36V73A14S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2247
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2346 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $9
36V73AI4S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL z
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2347 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROLSWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL A14 $9
36V73AI4S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2348 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SI0
36V73A14S10
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _-
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUND_CY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT B_RS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD-_
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SI0
36V73AI4SI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MAIFOLD.
OPERATIONS ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2251
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2350 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
B)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SI0
36V73AI4SI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPEL_T IN ...... WILLJETS FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPE_TIONS AND ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2252
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2351 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
2)
6)
7)
S)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS_ A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SI0
36V73AI4SI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2352 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
FLIGHT P_E
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL A14 $10
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI0
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3 ......
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL "
SHO_, __A_ _- _ _: _:_ _:_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NON ,Tm SECONTACTS NOT IN A C R6U .
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2254
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2353 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SI0
36V73AI4SI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2354 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SII
36V73AI4S!I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2256
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2355 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL A14 SII
36V73AI4SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
OPERATIONS ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2257
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2356 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS'HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
CRITICALiTIES_ _i__ _ _. _
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3 •
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SII
36V73A14S11
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ .............................................
PROPELLANT IN JETSWILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OFALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2357 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SII
36V73AI4SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2259
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2358 ABORT:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SII
36V73AI4SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL g
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2260
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2359 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH cONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SII
36V73AI4SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2261
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2360 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S12
36V73AI4SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
INLOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2262
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2361 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S12
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD, L
OPERATIONS ENTRY DETOS AND PTIS.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2362 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER COBOL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS MAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S12
PART aMBER: 36V73A14S12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2264
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2363 ABORT:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4 JETS
5) MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S12
36V73AI4SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2265
INDEPENDE_TORBiTER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST_CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2364 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S12
36V73AI4SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS _ NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL mm
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2266
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2365 ABORT:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3_3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S12
36V73AI4SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2267
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2366 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2268
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2367 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE "HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S13
36V73AI4SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2269
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2368 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S13
36V73AI4SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2270
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2369 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S13
36V73AI4SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2370 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO B12, DL, CL
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REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2272
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
2371 ABORT:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAULLEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S13
36V73AI4SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2273
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
HELIUM STORAGE TANK
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS
REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS
REGULATOR
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY
SENSING PORT
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY
SENSING PORT
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET
TEST PORT COUPLING
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT
COUPLINGS A & B
PROPELLANT TANK
PROP LINES, ALL
PROP LINES, ALL
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR
CHECKOUT COUPLING
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
PROP FEEDOUT TUBE
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT
CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT
CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT
BULKHEAD BLEED COUPLING
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR
CHECKOUT COUPLING
GIMBAL BELLOWS
FAILURE MODE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS CLOSED
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN), OR LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN) OR LEAKS (REVERSE
FLOW)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
D-I
MDAC
ID
139
140
141
145
146
147
148
150
152
153
155
158
159
162
163
166
167
170
171
174
175
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
185
186
187
ITEM
GIMBAL BELLOWS
PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
GROUNDMANUALISOLATION VALVE
GROUNDMANUALISOLATION VALVE
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL &
DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD I, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 2, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 3, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 4, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL vLv
MANIFOLD 5, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, ALL AXIS
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, -X AXIS
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, Y AXIS
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, Y AXIS
D-2
FAILURE MODE mm
RESTRICTED FLOW
BURST DISK RUPTURES AT LOW " u
PRESSURE, OR LEAKS
BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE,
RUPTURES AT A HIGHER THAN
NOMINAL PRESSURE, OR POPPET g
VALVE FAIL
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED) n
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), m
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY u
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), --
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN/ON)
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
U
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MDAC
ID
189
"190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
2O0
203
204
205
206
207
211
212
213
214
215
216
218
ITEM
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, Z AXIS
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
HELIUM STORAGE TANK
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS
REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS
REGULATOR
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR
ASSEMBLY
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR
ASSEMBLY
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR
ASSEMBLY
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR
PRIMARY SENSING PORT
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR
PRIMARY SENSING PORT
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR
OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
0PEN/ON)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
RESTRICTED FLOW
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNTHROUGH
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNTHROUGH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS CLOSED
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN), OR LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN) OR LEAKS (REVERSE
FLOW)
D-3
MDAC
ID
219
222
223
224
225
227
228
231
237
239
240
241
242
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
254
256
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
267
ITEM FAILURE MODE
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
PROPELLANT TANK
PROP LINES, ALL
PROP LINES, ALL
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
PROP FEEDOUT TUBE
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT
CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
PROP TK ENTRY SUMP BLEED
COUPLING
GIMBAL BELLOWS
GIMBAL BELLOWS
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
PROP TANK ISOLVLV 3/4/5/ A & B
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK )
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
BURST DISK RUPTURES AT LOW
PRESSURE, OR LEAKS
BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE,
RUPTURES AT A HIGHER THAN
NOMINAL PRESSURE, OR POPPET
VALVE FAIL
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
COUPLING OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
_IFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
COUPLING
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
CROSSFEED LINES
CROSSFEED LINES
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
RESTRICTED FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
mm
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268
271
272
275
276
279
280
283
284
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
294
296
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, +X AXIS
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, Y AXIS
298 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, Z AXIS
299 JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
300 JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
301 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
302 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
303 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
304 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
305 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
306 THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
LEAKS EXTERNALLY
RESTRICTED'FLOW
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN/ON)
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE
OR LEAK)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN/ON)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAKS EXTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
LEAKS INTERNALLY, ONE
PROPELLANT
RESTRICTED FLOW
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNTHROUGH
-- D-5
MDAC
ID
307
308
311
312
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
329
330
332
335
337
340
365
367
370
371
372
390
391
392
393
395
397
398
399
400
401
403
413
423
426
427
428
429
431
433
434
435
ITEM
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, VERNIER_
ALL AXES
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER / R_OTE POWER
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
FUSE, IA
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS Ii, 12
HE 0X & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE,
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
FAILURE MODE
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURNT_OUGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
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436
437
439
449
459
472
475
477
478
481
483
484
487
489
490
493
495
535
54O
546
55O
555
561
571
575
585
587
589
593
597
607
609
611
615
619
629
631
633
637
641
651
653
655
661
663
ITEM FAILURE MODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
OX _ FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE C0NTACTSFAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
FAILS SHORT
D-7
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669
673
677
681
693
702
7O5
706
7O9
710
713
714
717
793
798
8O2
807
811
816
820
825
834
835
838
84O
885
886
887
889
890
891
894
898
901
902
904
9O5
907
909
ITEM
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 3, OX _ FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, OX &-FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
DIODE
FAILURE MODE
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN _
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWTICH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
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911
913
915
917
919
921
922
923
925
927
928
929
931
933
934
935
936
937
939
941
943
945
947
948
949
950
954
955
956
957
960
963
966
968
970
971
972
974
976
988
1000
1016
1028
1034
1036
1059
1061
1065
ITEM
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE "
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY, LATCHING
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS 0PEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAILS
OPEN
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
D-9
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1067
1069
i071
1075
1077
1081
1083
1085
1087
1091
1093
Ii01
1103
1107
1109
1117
1119
1122
1124
1128
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1215
1216
1251
ITEM
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF
SWITCH CONTACTS7, 8
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDFIBFi MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH ON CONTACTSi, 2
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTSI, 2
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTS5, 6
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF
SWITCH CONTACTS7, 8
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH ON CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH ON CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER
ON SWITCH CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
RJDF2B LL/FL/R5 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCH
RJDF2B LL/FL/R5 MANIFOLD
DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
RJDF2B LL/FL/R5 MANIFOLD
DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
FUSE, 7.5A
FUSE, 7.5A
FUSE, 7.5A
FUSE, 7.5A
FUSE, 7.5A
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED (SHORTED)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED (SHORTED)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
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1252
1257
1259
1260
1261
1265
1267
1268
1273
1275
1276
1281
1283
1284
1295
1297
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1305
1310
1311
1313
1318
1320
1322
1324
1328
1330
1332
ITEM
MANIFOLD i, _ HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 1
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 2
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 3
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 4
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS,
- X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS,
Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS,
Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS,
ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT,_VERNIER THRUSTERS,
ALL AXES
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
FAILURE MODE
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCHFAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-11
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ID
1334
1338
1339
1341
1350
1351
1353
1405
1407
1410
1411
1412
1427
1430
1432
1433
1436
1437
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1450
1454
1458
1466
1479
1481
1485
1487
1499
1503
1507
1511
1513
1515
1541
1542
1543
1544
1545
1547
1548
ITEM
DIODE
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH GPC CONTACTSFAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN _
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED)
FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED)
FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED)
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1549
1550
1551
1553
1554
1555
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1563
1565
1566
1567
1568
1569
1571
1573
1576
1577
1580
1581
1584
1585
1588
1750
1755
1761
1765
1770
1781
1785
1786
1789
1794
1797
ITEM
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTSI, 2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS5, 6
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTSii, 12
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
A OR B SWITCH OPENCONTACTS1,2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS5, 6
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM
LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV
3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1,2
L/R OX & FU CR0SSFEED VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
D-13
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
FAILS CLOSED (FAILS IN
ENERGIZED POSITION)
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH FAILS IN FEED FROM
RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT
POSITION
SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
MDAC
ID ITEM
1798 L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
1800
1803
1804
1808
1813
1817
1822
1826
1831
1835
1840
1849
1850
1853
1855
1905
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1915
1917
1919
1920
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1930
1931
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 2, L/R 0X & FU IS0L
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV'SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN COMMAND i, 2
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE COMMAND 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
MANIFOLD 5, L/R 0X & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 11,12
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
FAILURE MODE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
m
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w
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MDAC
ID
1932
1933
1935
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1947
1949
1951
1952
1953
1955
1957
1958
1959
1961
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1969
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1977
1979
1997
1999
2001
2003
2006
2007
2008
2011
2014
2018
2020
2044
2046
2056
2062
2074
ITEM
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
FUSE, 2A
FUSE, 2A
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, 2A
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
D-15
FAILURE MODE
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS 0PEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS __ORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
MDAC
ID
2096
2106
2116
2128
2152
2170
2180
2198
2208
2226
2236
2254
2300
2301
2302
2303
2304
2305
2306
2307
2308
2309
2310
2311
2312
2313
2314
2315
2322
2323
2335
2337
2339
2340
2341
ITEM
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RJDAIB LI/LS/RI _IFOLD
DRIVER SWITCH
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD
LOGIC SWITCH
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCH
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD
LOGIC SWITCH
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDA2A L4/R4 _!FOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRI_._BRID
DRIVER. HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
DRIVER, HYBRID
FUSE, IA
FUSE, IA
FUSE, iA _
FUSE, 1A
FUSE, 1A
FUSE, 5A
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER,
_ALL AXES
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS,
+X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS,
Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS,
Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS,
ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS,
ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS HIGH
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORT
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
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MDAC
ID
2343
2344
2349
2350
2355
2356
2361
2362
2367
2368
ITEM
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
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